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 Introduction
Many economists have recommended that some ﬁscal restraint is required for price
stability (Sargent, 1999 ; Sargent and Wallace, 1981 ; von Thadden, 2004 ; Woodford, 2001 ;
Bhattacharya and Kudoh, 2002). This paper studies the implications of the sustainability of
bond-ﬁnanced deﬁcits for the conduct of monetary policy in a dynamic model with three
assets, money, bonds, and capital. To avoid the Chang-Hamberg-Hirata (1983) critique, this
paper builds a model of money as the most liquid asset. It is shown that, if the
government rolls over the debt to ﬁnance its deﬁcits, then there are inﬁnitely many
divergent equilibria, along which the outstanding debt increases, causing a massive
crowding out of productive capital. Delayed ﬁscal reform results in lower output, both at
the start of reform and in the long run.
Two new features of this paper are worth emphasizing. One is that the central bankʼs
balance sheet is separated from the governmentʼs budget constraint. An important implica-
tion of this policy regime is that currency seigniorage does not contribute to the revenue
of the government, and government bonds are held entirely by households. The other new
contribution of this paper is that it considers the implications of unsustainable bond-
ﬁnanced deﬁcits for disinﬂation and deﬂation. The literature has been concerned with
inﬂation as a result of the increasing need for revenue. If currency seigniorage is not part
of the ﬁscal authorityʼs revenue, there is no direct link between ﬁscal and monetary
policies. However, when bond-ﬁnanced deﬁcits are unsustainable, the economy temporarily
experiences a divergent nonstationary equilibrium, along which the real debt outstanding
increases over time, causing a massive crowding out.
The crowding out eﬀect of public debt― a permanent increase in government-issued
debt reduces the stock of productive capital and thereby reduces output― has long been
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recognized by the profession (Diamond, 1965 ; Modigliani, 1961 ; Phelps and Shell, 1969).
Chalk (2000) argued that although bond-ﬁnanced deﬁcits are known to be sustainable if
the real interest rate is less than the growth rate of the economy, there is a maximum
sustainable level of the deﬁcit. This paper sheds some new light on the crowding out
channel of a large and increasing public debt by extending the models of Diamond (1965)
and Chalk (2000) to a monetary economy. The key intuition obtained in this paper is that
when the bond-ﬁnanced deﬁcit is unsustainable, the economy temporarily experiences a
divergent nonstationary equilibrium. On such a path, the real debt outstanding increases
over time, causing the real interest rate to increase. This places a serious restriction on
the conduct of monetary policy. An increase in the real interest rate must accompany
either an increase in the nominal interest rate or a decrease in the rate of inﬂation. In
other words, the central bank will face a tradeoﬀ between a higher nominal interest rate
and a lower inﬂation rate.
The analytical framework employed in this paper is a monetary growth model with
overlapping generations (Aiyagari and Gertler, 1985 ; Bhattacharya and Kudoh, 2002 ;
Schreft and Smith, 1997; von Thadden, 2002, 2004). There are three means of saving :
productive capital, government bonds, and return-dominated ﬁat money. Money in this
economy is valued because it is the only liquid asset that allows agents to consume early
(Antonio and Martins, 1980 ; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). The key feature of the model is
the way money is injected into the economy. The existing monetary growth models with
government bonds assume that money is supplied via open market operations. Separating
the central bankʼs balance sheet from the governmentʼs budget constraint implies that
open market operations are ruled out. This paper alternatively assumes that money is
injected into the economy via ʻhelicopter dropsʼ, which is typically employed in monetary
growth models without government bonds.
This model reveals that the real interest rate increases over time on a divergent path
because the government rolls over the debt aggressively to ﬁnance its (unsustainable)
deﬁcit. Two interesting behaviors of variables are observed. One is that investment and
output decline as a result of massive crowding out. The other is that the economy will be
deﬂationary when the central bank commits to a (low) nominal interest rate. The
conventional view regarding unsustainable bond-ﬁnanced deﬁcits is that they are inﬂatio-
nary because the central bank is assumed to generate large inﬂation tax revenue when
the governmentʼs solvency is at stake. If the central bankʼs balance sheet is not part of the
governmentʼs revenue, then the sustainability of bond-ﬁnanced deﬁcits does not inﬂuence
the rate of inﬂation directly. Interestingly, however, the central bankʼs commitment to a
(low) nominal interest rate has a serious consequence. In order to maintain the nominal
interest rate (or the bond price), the central bank needs to inject more money into the
economy via helicopter drops. Because money is a free good (Correia and Teles, 1999), this
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helicopter money will create an income eﬀect, through which the real demand for money,
as well as the demand for bonds, will expand. This increase in the real money demand
implies a greater value of money. This is deﬂationary.
When the bond-nanced deﬁcit is unsustainable, a ﬁscal reform must take place eventu-
ally. This paper characterizes the equilibria after a tax-based reform in which the tax rate
is endogenous, while the debt-GDP ratio is held constant. The capital-labor ratio in the last
period of the old regime determines the initial condition for the new regime. Thus, a delay
in reform results in a low initial output. The analysis also establishes that a larger debt-
GDP ratio after the ﬁscal reform reduces the long-run level of output. Delayed ﬁscal
reform results in lower output, both at the start and in the long run.
 The Model
. Environment
Consider an economy consisting of an inﬁnite sequence of two-period-lived overlapping
generations, an initial old generation, and an inﬁnitely-lived government. Let t=1，2，…
index time. At each date t, a new generation is born. The population is normalized to one.
Each agent is endowed with one unit of labor when young and is retired when old. In
addition, the initial old agents are endowed with K>0 units of capital and M units of ﬁat
money.
There is a single ﬁnal good produced using the Cobb-Douglas production function
Y=AK
EN

with A≥1 and α∈0，1, where K denotes the capital input, N
denotes the labor input, and E denotes the labor-augmented technology, which is assumed
to grow exogenously. The gross rate of technical progress is n≡E/E. Let k≡K/EN
denote the eﬀective capital-labor ratio. Then, the intensive production function is
f k=Ak

. It is easy to see that f 0=0，f ′>0>f″, and the Inada conditions hold. The
ﬁnal good can either be consumed in the period it is produced, or stored to yield capital in
the next period. For expositional reasons, capital is assumed to depreciate 100％ between
periods.
. Factor Markets
Factor markets are perfectly competitive. Thus, factors of production receive their
marginal products. Let r and w denote the rental rate of capital and the real wage rate.
Each young agent supplies his or her labor endowment inelastically in the labor market.
Proﬁt maximization requires r=f ′k and w=f kE−kf ′kE. For convenience, let
wk≡f k−kf ′k so that w=wkE. Note that w′k=−kf″k>0. For the Cobb-
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Douglas speciﬁcation, r=αAk

and w=1−αAk

E.
. Government
Since Sargent and Wallaceʼs (1981) contribution, a consolidated government budget
constraint has become the building block of monetary policy analysis. However, such
budget constraints with ﬁscal deﬁcits imply that the monetary authority must raise
revenue by printing money in order to maintain the solvency of the government. The
implicit assumption of a weak or subordinate central bank appears inconsistent with the
recent state of central banking observed in developed economies.
In order to capture a tough, or independent, central bank, this paper follows Kudoh
(2007) to adopt a model which separates the central bankʼs budget from the ﬁscal
authorityʼs budget constraint. The two budget constraints are separated when  the ﬁscal
authority does not receive any seigniorage revenue from the central bank ; and  the
central bank never purchases government bonds. The requirement  is insuﬀ cient for
separating the monetary authorityʼs budget from that of the ﬁscal authority because if
money is supplied via open market purchases of government bonds, then the two budget
constraints are connected and only the consolidated budget constraint matters. Since open
market operations are ruled out, government bonds are held entirely by households.
Let G denote government spending, T denote the amount of tax revenue, I≥1 denote
the gross nominal interest rate, and B denote the amount of one-period government bonds
issued in period t. The ﬁscal authorityʼs budget constraint under this regime is
G+IB=T+B ⑴
for t≥2 and G=T+B for t=1. I assume that the government simply consumes G and
that it does not aﬀect the utility of any generation or the production process at any date.
Divide ⑴ by pE, and use the Fisher equation, R≡Ip/p, to obtain
g=τ+b−
R
n
b， ⑵
where g=G/pE，τ=T/pE, and b=B/pE. Since bonds and capital are competing
ﬁnancial assets in this economy, the non-arbitrage condition requires the rates of return on
these assets be the same in equilibrium. Thus, R=f ′k.
In order to separate the budgets, I assume money to be supplied via “helicopter drops”.
The quantity of money injection at time t is denoted by H. Thus,
H=M−M ⑶
for t≥1, where M>0 because the initial old is endowed with ﬁat money. From the
householdʼs perspective, H is a subsidy from the government. Thus, equation ⑶ implies
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that the monetary authority returns the revenue from printing money to the consumers.
Divide ⑶ by pE to obtain
h=m−
p
pn
m， ⑷
where h=H/pE and m=M/pE.
. Consumers
In order to focus on agentsʼportfolio choice, I assume that all individuals save all their
income. As a means of saving, agents may hold money and non-monetary assets. In order
to motivate the demand for money as a liquid asset, divide each period into two
subperiods. The non-monetary assets, denoted by Z, are assumed to yield a gross nominal
return of I≥1 in the next period. However, the non-monetary assets cannot be liqui-
dated until the second subperiod. Money, whose nominal interest rate is zero, is assumed
to be the only liquid asset in this economy. Thus, the only distinction between money and
non-monetary assets is that non-monetary assets must be held a little longer (Antonio and
Martins, 1980). This liquidity structure helps resolve the Chang-Hamberg-Hirata (1983)
critique on the traditional money demand theory.
Suppose that each individual wishes to consume in both subperiods. Let c and c
denote the consumption of the ﬁnal good in the ﬁrst and second subperiods by an old
agent born at date t. The consumerʼs objective function is ϕuc+1−ϕuc, where ϕ
captures the relative weight of utility between the two subperiods. Throughout, I use the
following speciﬁcation : uc=1−ρc with ρ≠1 and ρ>0. Since the individual cannot
liquidate non-monetary assets in the ﬁrst subperiod, the agent faces a cash-in-advance
constraint :
pc≤M. ⑸
The individualʼs budget constraint when young is
M+Z=pw+H−T, ⑹
where the consumer takes H and T as given. Similarly, the budget constraint when old is
pc+pc=M+IZ. ⑺
The cash-in-advance constraint binds as long as the nominal interest rate is positive
i. e., I>1. Under binding cash-in-advance constraint, ⑺ implies pc=IZ
=Ipw+H−T−M. Thus, a young individualʼs maximization problem is:
max

ϕ
M/p

1−ρ
+1−ϕ
 pw+H−T−MI/p

1−ρ .
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Use the ﬁrst-order condition to obtain the money demand function as
M=γ Ipw+H−T， ⑻
γ I≡1+
1−ϕ
ϕ 

I


. ⑼
It is easy to establish that (a) γ′ I <0 holds for ρ∈0，1 ; (b) lim

γ I =0 for
ρ∈0，1 ; and (c) lim

γ I =1+ 1−ϕ/ϕ. The value of ρ captures the strength
of th0e income eﬀect of a change in I. Throughout, I focus on the case in which ρ∈0，1
so that the income eﬀect is relatively weak. There are several other environments which
lead to the same money demand function. A leading example is Schreft and Smith (1997),
who consider a model with spatially separated markets.
Divide ⑻ by pE to obtain
m=γ I wk+h−τ. ⑽
The asset market equilibrium requires Z=B+pK. Divide it by pE to obtain
b+nk=1−γ I  wk+h−τ. ⑾
These two equations imply b+nk=m/Γ I , where Γ I ≡γ I 1−γ I  

.
 Equilibria under Permanent Deﬁcits
. Characterization
A monetary equilibrium is a set of sequences for real allocations m，b，k and
relative prices R，Π and initial conditions M≥0，B≥0 such that (a) each generation
maximizes utility ; (b) asset market clears ; (c) factor markets clear ; (d) the ﬁscal
authorityʼs ﬂow budget constraint ⑵ is satisﬁed for t≥2 and g=τ+b for t=1; (e)
money injection satisﬁes ⑷ ; (f) ﬁscal policy speciﬁes g=g and τ=τ ; and (g) monetary
policy speciﬁes I=I . The Fisher equation implies I=Πf ′k, from which it is easy to
verify that Πf″kdk+f ′kdΠ=0. Thus, in any equilibrium, k and Π are positively
related under nominal interest rate pegging.
To simplify the analysis, in what follows I let τ=0. Then the ﬁscal authorityʼs budget
constraint becomes
b=
f ′k
n
b+g. ⑿
Thus, the real debt in the next period is inﬂuenced by the current outstanding debt and
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Figure 1 : Phase diagram
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the real interest rate on the debt. It is important to notice that the government is running
a debt Ponzi game― it issues bonds each period in order to ﬁnance the deﬁcit and the
interest obligation on the outstanding debt. As is well known, a debt Ponzi game is
sustainable in a deterministic environment if and only if the real interest rate is less than
the growth rate of the economy. This suggests that the government can roll over the debt
forever as long as f ′k<n.
The evolution of the capital-labor ratio is given by
k=
f k−g
n
−μ I 
f ′k
n k+
b
n ， ⒀
where μ I ≡1+γ I 1−γ I  I  and μ′ I <0. Diﬀerence equations ⑿ and ⒀ jointly
determine the paths for b and k, given the initial conditions, b and k.
From ⑿ and ⒀, a steady-state equilibrium is characterized by a pair of b and k that
satisfy
b=
g
1−f ′k/n
≡Fk， ⒁
b=
f k−g−nk
μ I f ′k/n
−nk≡Φk. ⒂
Let k solve f ′k=n. For k>k, the economy is dynamically ineﬀcient, so the govern-
ment can run a debt Ponzi game. Function F slopes down for all k and is positive for
k>k. Function Φ is S-shaped. Figure 1 depicts typical conﬁgurations of functions F and Φ.
The ﬁgure suggests that there are four steady-state equilibria to consider (Azariadis, 1993 ;
de la Croix and Michel, 2002). One is the trivial one at 0，0. Another one, labeled k=k,
satisﬁes b<0. This steady state is quantitatively unimportant because k is negligibly
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small. There are at most two steady-state equilibria with b>0. For these steady states to
exist, the productivity of the economy must be suﬀciently large and the deﬁcit must be
suﬀciently small.
. Dynamic Properties
Consider the stability of each steady state. Subtract b from ⑿ to obtain
b−b= f ′k/n−1b+g. Thus, b>b ⇔ b>Fk for k<k and b>b ⇔
b<Fk for k>k. Subtract k from ⒀ to obtain k−k= f k−g/n−k
−μ I k+b/nf ′k/n, from which it is easy to verify that k>k ⇔ b<Φk.
Figure 1 depicts a phase diagram of the model. It is easy to verify that the low-k steady
state k is a saddle while the high-k steady state k  is a sink. The phase diagram
suggests that the trivial steady state at 0，0 and k=k are both unstable ; for suﬀciently
small values of k, the outstanding debt increases until the economy violates the equilibrium
conditions. Thus, k=k is the only stable steady state under this policy regime.
According to the textbook macroeconomic dynamics, the low-k steady-state, which is a
saddle, is said to be locally determinate, because there is only one convergent path to this
steady state. If all other paths were ruled out, then the steady state would be stable and
unique. This economy, however, never approaches the low-k steady state unless it happens
to be on the saddle path initially. This is because the high-k steady state is a sink : the
economy starting at any initial condition below the saddle path approaches the high-k
steady state.
In order to understand the working of the model, I present a numerical example which
illustrates how the economy approaches the long-run equilibrium from an initial condition.
First, compute the two steady states using ⒁ and ⒂. I choose the parameter values as
A=1, α=0.3, ϕ=0.45, ρ=0.2, and n=1.01. For policy parameters, I choose g=0.01 and
I=1.02. Then the steady-state equilibria are k=0.20 and k=0.44. The associated levels
of b are 0.02 and 0.13. Equilibrium for t≥2 is fully described by ⑿ and ⒀. Since b=0, at
date t=1, k= f k−g/n−μ I f ′kk/n, from ⒀, and b=g from ⑿. Thus, once the
initial capitallabor ratio is given, the equilibrium sequences of all endogenous variables are
determined. It is important to note here that the amount of ﬁscal deﬁcit at the beginning
of the world determines b. Figure 2 computes the transition path to the stable steady
state, starting from k=0.1. As is evident, the economy approaches k=0.44, the high-k
steady state, although it started below the low-k steady state. This veriﬁes that the low-k
steady state, although a saddle, is indeed unstable. The economy approaches the stable
steady state without any jump in variables because there are inﬁnitely many paths leading
to the steady state.
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Figure 2 : Transition to the stable steady state
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. Maximum Sustainable Deﬁcit
It is illustrative to investigate how the steady state revenue of the government is
inﬂuenced by the rate of inﬂation in this economy. Focus on a steady state. Expressions ⑽
and ⑾ imply b+nk=m/Γ I . Eliminate h from ⑷ and ⑽ to obtain m
=γ I wk1−γ I 1−1/Πn . Substitute this into b+nk=m/Γ I  to obtain
wkb+nk=1+Γ I /nΠ. The Fisher equation, I=Πf ′k, implicitly deﬁnes k=λΠ.
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Figure 3 : Revenue from Bonds
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Solve wkb+nk=1+Γ I =n/Π, for b as b=1+Γ I =n/ΠwλΠ −nλΠ
≡ΨΠ. Thus, ﬁscal authorityʼs budget constraint is written in terms of Π as
g=1−
R
n b=1−
I
nΠ ΨΠ≡LΠ. ⒃
The right-hand-side of equation ⒃, LΠ, is referred to as a Laﬀer curve, which maps the
rate of inﬂation into the total government net revenue. A Laﬀer curve tells us mainly two
things. One is the maximum possible revenue. The government can never ﬁnance the
deﬁcit that exceeds the peak of the Laﬀer curve. The other important information the
Laﬀer curve contains is whether the government should increase or decrease inﬂation to
ﬁnance a greater amount of deﬁcit. If the Laﬀer curve slopes up, then the government can
raise more revenue by expansionary monetary policy.
Although LΠ is not very tractable analytically, numerical examples suggest that it is
humpshaped, as in Figure 3. The parameters are the same as in the previous example.
From the peak of the Laﬀer curve, the maximum sustainable level of deﬁcit for this
economy is about g=0.029. It is interesting to note that Laﬀer curve analysis is still
possible, even though the ﬁscal authority in this economy receives no currency seigniorage.
The ﬁscal authorityʼs revenue is still inﬂuenced by inﬂation because changes in inﬂation
aﬀect the real interest obligation on the outstanding debt. There is another channel,
through which changes in inﬂation aﬀect the ﬁscal authorityʼs revenue. Changes in inﬂation
aﬀect the demand for bonds and this eﬀect is captured by function ΨΠ.
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" Unsustainable Deﬁcits and Stabilization Policy
. Preliminaries
This section studies the economy in which the ﬁscal authority plays an unsustainable
Ponzi game. For t≤J−1, the ﬁscal authority runs a permanent deﬁcit of ﬁxed size, g−τ,
which is ﬁnanced entirely by issuing bonds. This section is interested in the case where
the deﬁcit is not sustainable so that the real debt b increases without bound. If bond-
ﬁnanced deﬁcits are unsustainable, then sooner or later the ﬁscal authority will have to
shift its policy regime. Suppose that a ﬁscal reform takes place in period t=J . The date of
stabilization is assumed to be known. Let b≡b denote the level of real debt outstanding
at the beginning of period J (or, the real bonds sold in period J−1). It is assumed that for
t≥J , the government maintains b=b , and the tax rate is determined so as to maintain
solvency. This regime is related to the “passive ﬁscal policy” (Leeper, 1991 ; von Thadden,
2004). The initial condition for the capital-labor ratio is given by k, which is determined as
part of the equilibrium in period J−1.
. Stabilization
Consider the equilibria for t≥J . Since government expenditures are not the central issue,
I maintain the assumption of g being constant. Since the central bankʼs revenue is
separated from the ﬁscal authorityʼs budget, the ﬁscal authority in this new regime must
raise revenue through tax.
Thus, from ⑴ the ﬁscal authorityʼs budget constraint determines the tax :
τ=g−b−f ′kb/n. It is easy to verify that the amount of tax is decreasing in capital.
The reason is because as the stock of capital increases, the real interest rate is reduced.
Since the real return on capital equals the return on government bonds in equilibrium, the
increase in the real interest rate raises the interest payment on the outstanding debt.
Since there is no currency seigniorage available for the ﬁscal authority, the deﬁcit must be
cut by raising tax.
The evolution of the capital-labor ratio is given by
k=
f k−g
n
−μ I 
f ′k
n k+
b
n ≡Ωk. ⒄
The map k=Ωk describes the equilibrium law of motion of the capital-labor ratio for
t≥J . The initial condition for k is given by k. Thus, although the initial condition k and
b are treated as exogenous in the post-stabilization economy, they are determined in the
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Figure 4 : Economy after the ﬁscal reform
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prestabilization economy and therefore not free parameters. It is easy to verify that
Ωk>0 holds only if αμ I <1. To understand the condition, suppose for the moment
that there is no ﬁscal spending or debt outstanding. Then the economy evolves according
to k=1−αμ I  Ak
/n. Thus, condition αμ I <1 requires a Laissez-faire economy
with money and capital to have a nontrivial steady state.
In what follows, I focus on the case in which αμ I <1. For the Cobb-Douglas speciﬁca-
tion, Ωk=1−αμ I  Ak/n−g/n−μ I Akb/n. Then, Ω′k=1−αμ I  αAk/n
+μ I 1−αAkb/n. It is then easy to establish that Function Ω satisﬁes ⒜Ω′k>0
for all k, ⒝ lim

Ωk=−∞, ⒞ lim

Ω′k=∞, ⒟ lim

Ω′k=0, ⒠∂Ω/∂g<0, and ⒡∂Ω/∂b<0.
There are at most two steady-state equilibria, as shown in Figure 4. The existence of a
steady state is not guaranteed. In particular, if g or b are too high, then there is no steady
state. Note that, although g may be chosen to be zero for t≥J , the level of b is
predetermined. Thus, even if g=0, a steady state may not exist if b is too large. This
suggests that J cannot be too large.
Throughout this paper, I focus on the case in which there are two distinct steady states,
in other words, the case of successful stabilization. From the ﬁgure, it is easy to verify
that the high-k steady state is stable and the low-k steady state is unstable. Let k and k
denote respectively the low-k and high-k steady states. Since the high-k steady state is
stable, the economy that restarts with k∈k，∞ will eventually reach the stable steady
state. Since k and Π are positively related under the nominal interest rate targeting, the
inﬂation rate increases over time on the transition if k∈k，k. If the economy restarts
with k∈0，k, then it will shrink over time and the capital-labor ratio will be zero
eventually.
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Figure 5 : Divergent path and deﬂation
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Proposition 1 An increase in b raises k and reduces k.
The result is easily veriﬁed by noticing ∂Ω/∂b<0. The implications of Proposition 1 are
quite important. First, an increase in k implies that the post-stabilization economy must
start with a higher capital-labor ratio. Otherwise the economy cannot reach the steady
state and the reform will fail. Second, a reduction in k implies a lower output in the long
run. To summarize, there are two beneﬁts of ﬁscal reform taking place sooner : One is that
the economy can restart at a high level of initial capital. The other is that it can restart
with a low b , implying a high long-run output.
. Unsustainable Ponzi Game, Crowding out, and Deﬂation
Turn to the ﬁrst regime, in which the ﬁscal authority runs a permanent deﬁcit of a
ﬁxed size and rolls over the debt to ﬁnance the deﬁcit. As shown in Section 3, a debt
Ponzi game is sustainable in steady states k and k. This section explores a scenario in
which the economy fails to reach a steady state. Such a scenario arises for two reasons.
One is when the economyʼs initial condition does not lead to a steady state. The other is
when there is no steady state in the ﬁrst place (Chalk, 2000).
Consider Figure 5. All paths below the saddle path are convergent and those above the
saddle path are divergent. The trajectory starting at point A is the saddle path, while the
trajectory starting at point B is an example of a divergent path. The phase diagram
suggests that on a divergent path, such as the trajectory starting at point B, the public
debt increases and the capital-labor ratio decreases over time. In other words, the high
growth of government bonds crowds out productive capital aggressively and output
declines over time as a result.
Since the capital-labor ratio declines, the real interest rate increases over time on a
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Figure 6 : Nonexistence of steady state
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divergent path. Under nominal interest rate targeting, a rise in the real interest rate
translates into a decline in the rate of inﬂation. Thus, the economy on the divergent path
is disinﬂationary, although not necessarily deﬂationary. The Fisher equation gives the
condition for deﬂation : I<f ′k. Let k solve I=f ′k. Then the economy becomes
deﬂationary if it enters the region k<k. It is evident that the deﬂationary region expands
as the nominal interest rate gets closer to its lower bound at I=1.
In equilibrium, the demand and supply of government bonds must be balanced. An
increase in the supply of bonds must accompany an increase in the demand of the same
quantity. If the nominal interest rate were allowed to adjust, then an increase in the
demand for bonds would imply an increase in the nominal interest rate. Suppose the
central bank commits to a certain level of the nominal interest rate. The central bank can
implement its commitment by injecting money into the economy. Since money creation
requires no real resource cost, money is a free good (Correia and Teles, 1999). Thus,
money injection creates an income eﬀect, and it expands the demand for bonds without
raising the nominal interest rate. As a by-product, there is an increase in the real demand
for money, and this raises the value of ﬁat money.
An interesting case arises when there is no steady-state equilibrium. Suppose that the
economy is originally at the high-k, the stable, steady state. Suppose also that the ﬁscal
authority increases g too much. A possible phase diagram under such a scenario is
depicted in Figure 6. Clearly, there is no non-trivial steady state. The economy will
approach the northwest of the diagram for any initial condition. On a divergent path, the
debt grows over time and as a result of crowding out, the capital-labor ratio, output, and
the rate of inﬂation decrease over time. The possibility of deﬂation on a divergent path has
been pointed out by Buiter (1987), who adopted a version of Sargent and Wallace (1981)
to consider the case in which there is no steady state equilibrium as a result of the
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Figure 7 : Economy on a divergent path
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government running too large a deﬁcit. In Buiter (1987), stabilization policy is not
considered even though the deﬁcit is unsustainable.
Figure 7 computes the paths for k, b, and the inﬂation rate for the same economy as
the one presented previously, starting with the old steady state level at k=0.44 and
b=0.02. I let g=0.05 instead of 0.01. In this case, there is no steady state because the
maximum sustainable deﬁcit is 0.029. Other parameter values are the same as before. The
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Figure 8 : Equilbrium path
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debt-GDP ratio surges over time and the rate of inﬂation declines.
Figure 8 describes an example of the entire equilibrium path of the economy for
t=1，…∞. For t≤J−1, there is no steady state, so the governmentʼs Ponzi game is
unsustainable. Thus, given k and b, the economy moves to the northwest of the diagram.
Along the path, the capitallabor ratio, output, and the rate of inﬂation decline, and the
public debt and the real interest rate increase over time. A new policy regime starts in
period J with the capital labor ratio k. The economy evolves according to k=Ωk for
t≥J to approach k. Along the path, the capital-labor ratio, output, and the rate of inﬂation
increase over time while the real interest rate decreases.
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4 Conclusion
In the literature, the analysis usually stops when no stable steady-state equilibrium is
found. The main contribution of this paper involves exploring the behavior of economies on
divergent paths. Along a divergent path, the capital declines and the public debt increases
over time. Since the bond-ﬁnanced deﬁcit is unsustainable, a ﬁscal reform will have to take
place. Delayed ﬁscal reform implies a lower capital and greater public debt. This results in
lower output, both at the start and in the long run.
This paper has maintained the assumption that all agents know that a regime shift takes
place in period J. It is worthwhile to explore a scenario in which each generation faces a
positive probability of a regime change, as considered by Drazen and Helpman (1990).
Such an extension would create a direct link between an inevitable future regime shift and
the current output and prices. It is also important to investigate a “Ponzi gamble,” the
notion proposed by Ball et al. (1998). In this scenario, the government attempts to run a
Ponzi game, but it is not sure if the policy is sustainable. In this sense, Ponzi games
become gambles in environments with uncertainty. Ball et al. (1998) considered a Ponzi
gamble in a real economy. It would be interesting to explore the implications of a Ponzi
gamble for the conduct of monetary policy.
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